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In response to John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative
Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (2008).
The debate that has raged in the legal literature for the last dec-
ade about benefit-cost analysis (BCA) in regulatory decision making
about the environment has not been very productive for two key rea-
sons: (1) it has focused on the way that BCA is used in the OIRA re-
view process to "fine tune"1 regulations just before they are issued, and
(2) it has suffered from "selective realism" - by discussing the flaws of
BCA but not comparing them to the flaws of human decision making
unaided by BCA.
John Graham's 146 page, fiull-throated defense of BCA brings
much needed balance to this debate by answering the critics.3 His ar-
ticle is particularly useful for making accessible to lawyers and law stu-
dents the ethical and philosophical underpinnings of BCA, and also
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1 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Reguhn 1o Effirien'y: Implenenlalio of Urn
form Slandards and 'Tine Tuning" Regulaloi Refi ns, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985).
2 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Activity Leve&, Due Care, and ,Selective Realism in Economic
Analysis I'J71,0 Law, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 487 (1987).
John D. Grahan, Saving Lives Tlough Adminishlaive Law and LEconomics, 157 U.
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for demonstrating by example that BCA is not inherently anti-
regulatory and can be useful for convincing skeptical politicians to
sign off on tough environmental regulations. But, unfortunately,
Graham's article implicitly buys into the two conceptual traps that it
inherits from the critics: both the "fine tuning" and the "selective re-
alism" fallacies.
I. THE FINE-TUNING FALLACY
The limitations of BCA are well-known and are well-documented
in the 622 footnotes to the Graham article. The key one was aptly
summed up a generation ago: the tyranny of false precision.
Assume that a typical political appointee is told that the projected
benefits of a reduction in the drinking-water standard for arsenic from
50 to 10 parts per billion (ppb) are (say) $150 million in excess of the
costs, but that the costs would be $100 million greater than the incre-
mental benefits if one were to reduce the standard further to 8 ppb.
Most political appointees, not being academic experts on BCA, might
understandably and foreseeably think that this information counsels
in favor of adopting the 10 ppb standard and rejecting the further re-
duction to 8 ppb. In my experience, debates at OIRA and the White
House often come down to issues like this-of selecting among two
plausible policy options with minor differences that result in multi-
million dollar consequences.' In fact, the debate over whether to re-
duce the arsenic standard to 10 ppb or 8 ppb is one of the real-world
examples that Graham cites. In actuality, our hypothetical political
appointee would be very much mistaken in his or her naive belief that
the hypothetical BCA posited above is actually telling him or her to set
the standard at 10 ppb rather than 8 ppb. And that is because BCA is
too blunt and imprecise an instrument to rely on for making such
fine-grained policy decisions, for the reasons that I explain in the bal-
4 See Laurence H. Tribe, Technohg3 Assessmet and the FouIh Discontinuity: The Lim-
its qfnslrumenal Rationality, 46 S. Cal. L. Rev. 617, 630 (1973) (observing that the
complexity and value-laden nature of environmental problens precludes straightfor-
ward applications of instrumental rationality, such as BCA).
5 Admittedly, the OIRA process changes fron administration to administration,
but, in the last three, "return letters," in which the OIRA Administrator essentially ve-
toes a proposed regulation outright and sends it back to the agency, have been exceed-
ingly rare. This is not to say that BCA has no effect on agencies, however. Knowing
that a regulation will eventually be subject to BCA and review by the OMB may deter
agencies from proposing regulations that they might otherwise have pursued, but this
effect is difficult to measure.
See Graham, supm note 3, at 491-94.
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ance of this Section and that Graham and every other sophisticated
user of BCA acknowledges.'
The critics are off target when they criticize BCA as "fatally
flawed" s because it cannot tell us whether to set the arsenic standard
at 10 ppb or 8 ppb. The problem lies not in BCA as a technique, but
rather in the design of the OMB review process that invites the fore-
seeable misuse of BCA to "fine tune" regulations, and in the failure of
most administrations to train their political appointees adequately to
appreciate the limitations of BCA as a technique.9 It makes no sense
to condemn BCA as fatally flawed because it cannot validly be used to
fine tune regulations. Any tool for supplementing human percep-
tions has limitations in its resolving power. Condemning BCA as fa-
tally flawed because it cannot distinguish fine gradations in regulatory
standard-setting is like saying a telescope is "fatally flawed" because it
cannot focus on a microbe. It is the responsibility of the user to pick
the right tool for the job at hand.
On the "fine tuning" issues that actually dominate the OIRA re-
view process, such as whether to set the revised arsenic standard at 8
ppb or 10 ppb, BCA is not merely of limited utility, but it is potentially
dangerous because it is foreseeably subject to misuse by those who are
not attuned to its limitations. The reason was aptly summed up by a
famous epidemiologist, Leon Gordis, then Dean of the Johns Hopkins
School of Public Health, who once cautioned me "you lawyers torture
the epidemiological data until they scream. ' ° That was not, however, a
7 See /in/ text accompanying note 13.
s See, e.g., The Rtgulatos' Best ibiend?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 2005, at 72, 72 ("Is the
[BCA] method fatally flawed and intrinsically anti-regulatory? The Centre for Progres-
sive Regulation (CPR), a think-tank that shelters many sceptics, thinks so.").
9 I made these points some years ago in an article criticizing the design of the
OIRA review process. E. Donald Elliott, TM-ing OMVB: Or Why Jegula, toU Review Untder
Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 167 (1994). Unfortunately, rather than making constructive sug-
gestions for how to improve the OIRA review process to ameliorate its weaknesses,
most of the subsequent work in the legal academic literature has veered off in the di-
rection of criticizing BCA as inherently flawed. Meanwhile, subsequent OIRA Admin-
istrators, including both Sally Katzen and John Graham, have made substantial practi-
cal improvements in the process, so that some of my criticisms, such as those relating
to lack of transparency, are no longer valid. See id. at 181-82. However, others, such as
that OIRA review comes into play too late in the process and that most political ap-
pointees lack appropriate training in risk assessment and BCA, are still valid. See id. at
184.
10 Personal communication with Leon Gordis, Dean of the Johns Hopkins School
of Public Health (1989). However, Gordis makes some of the same points about what
epidemiology can and cannot say on issues of interest to lawsyers in Leon Gordis, Epi-
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condemnation of epidemiology as a science as being fatally flawed,
but rather of the lawyers who try to make the data say more than they
really do.
The essential reason that we should oppose the misuse of BCA in
fine-tuning regulatory decisions runs throughout Graham's 146 page
defense: BCA is a highly technical discipline and its results can be
skewed widely by small changes in assumptions. Over and over again
when answering critics, Graham drops back to suggest potential
"methodological advances"11 that might be made to ameliorate diffi-
culties in BCA as currently practiced in government. For example,
when confronted by the "poster child" for indeterminacy in the legal
literature-the claim by Professor Sunstein (who has recently been
named the next OIRA Administrator) that "the benefits could be any-
where from $0 to $3.8 billion per year"'2 for EPA's decision to reduce
the standard for arsenic in drinking water from 50 ppb to 10 ppb' 3-
Graham responds that (1) if he "assumed ... a discount rate of 3% is
more plausible than 7% ',14 and (2) commissioned a graduate student
to conduct 2500 computer runs of probability distributions of uncer-
tainties, there was a roughly two to one chance that the reduction to
10 ppb actually produced some net benefits. '
"The lady doth protest too much.'t 1 If a sophisticated computer-
ized Monte Carlo analysis (which is not normally done in govern-
ment) is needed to determine that a reduction from 50 ppb to 10 ppb
for arsenic in drinking water probably produced net benefits (under
certain discounting assumptions, but not under others), then it is
unlikely that the technique can contribute much to making such fine-
grained decisions as whether to regulate at 8 ppb or 10 ppb. Graham
quietly concedes as much in footnote 416, admiting that " [g]iven the
inherent uncertainties in BCA of lifesaving, results are likely to be
more determinative for larger policy changes (e.g., 10 versus 50 ppb
demiologic Approaches Jor Studying Jlumaun Diseases in Relation to Jlazamdous Waste Disposal
Sites, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 837 (1988).
II See, e.g., Graham, suna note 3, at 451-52.
12 Wi. at 491.
Il Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic qfArsenic, 90 GLO. L.J. 2255, 2288 tbl.6 (2002)
(discussed in Graham, su[pm note 3, at 491 & n.412).
14 Graharn, supra note 3, at 491-92.
15 Id.
16 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2,1. 221 (Burton Raffel ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2003).
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arsenic in water) than smaller policy changes (e.g., 9.5 versus 10.0 ppb
arsenic in water)."''
To reduce the risks of foreseeable misuse of BCA by decision
makers who are not as sophisticated as Graham, such decision makers
should be trained in the limitations of the technique (a project on
which Graham's article makes a good start). John Graham has spent
much of his professional life studying and teaching BCA. He is one of
a handful of people in America who is an "intelligent consumer" of
BCA, is capable of understanding its limitations and biases, and thus is
able to counteract them. But we should not assume that similarly so-
phisticated consumers of BCA will always be at the heln. To minimize
the foreseeable misunderstanding and misuse of BCA, political deci-
sion makers should all be taught the limitations, as well as the potential
uses, of BCA techniques. This important policy recommendation is,
however, conspicuous by its absence from Graham's laundry list of
policy recommendations.
The flaw, however, is not with BCA as a technique per se, but
rather its misuse in the procedural system in which it is currently em-
bedded. An OIRA review process that brings BCA into the policy
process very late in the day, when the die is largely cast for new regula-
tions and the government is merely fine tuning the final result.8 This
is what now-Justice Stephen Breyer famously called a "mismatch, ' ) us-
ing a regulatory technique in a situation for which it is ill-suited. In
fact, BCA is much more useful at the front end of the process, when we
are setting priorities and evaluating potential candidates for addi-
tional regulatory investments. Should we be spending more on im-
proving highway safety, or would our investments save more lives if
devoted to prenatal care instead?2' Here the inherent weaknesses in
17 Graham, supma note 3, at 492 n.416. Graham goes on to argue in the same foot-
note, however, that "in the range of the incremental policy changes that characterize
America's pluralistic democracy, BCA may often have insights to offer." Id. I agree,
but it is worth noting that the example that Graham gives-climate-change policy-is
not a fine-tuning of a proposed regulation in the OIRA review process. Id. (citingJohn
D. Graham, Valutng the Future: OVB' Reflined Position, 74 I. CHI. L. REV. 51, 54-55
(2007)).
18 For more on this, see Elliott, supra note 9.
19 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, at pt. II (1982) (using a "mis-
match thesis" to uncover areas of regulator y failure "to match the tool to the problem
at hand").
2 See gen, ily E. Donald Elliott & Alan B. Horowitz, Risk-Based Environmenital Pfior-
lies: Whal IPlolil)?, i, NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES REGULATION: WHERE IS THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PENDILUM NOW? (1994) (evaluating comparative risk assessment in the
environmental context).
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BCA are less problematic, because BCA provides a consistent, albeit
somewhat arbitrary, metric for comparing potential investments.
Moreover, the differences among various candidates for future regula-
tory investments are often very large (differing by several orders of
magnitude in terms of the numbers of lives that can be saved for a
given investment of resources), so that they dwarf the imprecision in
BCA. To his credit, Graham acknowledges that BCA can play a useful
role in identifying attractive opportunities for regulatory investments
and makes an innovative proposal for the National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS) to use BCA to recommend attractive opportunities for• 21
potential lifesaving investments.
But on close questions, such as those that typically arise in the
OIRA review process, political judgment and subjective decision mak-
ing by human beings cannot be replaced by "objective" decision tech-
niques such as BCA for much the same reasons that computers cannotS 22
replace judges. In the example of changes to the arsenic in drinking
water standard, the Bush administration faced a difficult political situa-
tion because it had chosen to review a reduction from 50 ppb to 10
ppb that had been promulgated in the last days of the previous ad-
ministration. This was widely portrayed in the press as indicating that
President Bush wanted children to drink more poisonous arsenic in
their water.23 The House responded by adopting an appropriations
rider that would have precluded the Bush EPA from reconsidering the
10 ppb Clinton standard.2' A panel of the NAS was re-convened to
deal with the political hot potato, and it concluded that 10 ppb was
21 See Graham, supi note 3, at 530-32.
22 On the question of whether computers can replace judges, see RICHARD SUSS-
KIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
278-79 (1996) (speculating that, while future computers may play some role in theju-
dicial process, judges will still have a role in making moral and ethical judgments that
computers cannot, or should not, make); Anthony D'Amato, Can/Should Computers Re-
place.Judges?, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277 (1977) (exploring the theoretical andjurisprudential
questions of what would be gained and lost if computers were programmed to perform
judicial flunctions). For nry own answer, see E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution:
Legal Piocess as Arlwficial nlelligerce, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 142-43 (1984), where I argue
that judges must use judgment" to change the common law, as well as replicate pre-
existing principles. I do not understand Graham to argue that BCA should replace
human judgment. On the contrary, he argues for a "soft" reliance on BCA, and rightly
points out that most of the critics are attacking a strawiman in a "hard" version of BCA,
which makes BCA the sole criterion for decisions. Graham, sun-a note 3, at 432-34.
2J, See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., The Asbeslos Presidenl, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001,
§ 4, at 17 ("W. wants to keep the poison [arsenic] in [drinking water]-to help the en-
viro-villains who contributed to his campaign.").
24 See Senate Suppot.s Tougher Ai'senic Staudard, SAFEDRINKNGWATER.COM, Aug. 2,
2001, http://NNw.safediinkingwater.coin/alerts/aleit080201 .htii.
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the minimum standard that would be health-protective, and perhaps
even a lower standard in the range of 3 ppb was justified.tm
This political context cannot be captured in a BCA, but it is cer-
tainly appropriate for decision makers to consider. Moreover, in mak-
ing a decision today, a policymaker may often have to hazard a guess
about the future direction of scientific developments. In light of the
NAS report and the emerging science showing harms from arsenic at
ever lower levels, one could validly conclude that 10 ppb was the
minimum acceptable standard, even if it was not supported by BCA.
II. THE "SELECTIVE REALISM" FALLACY
The second conceptual pitfall into which most critics fall is in
comparing a realistic version of BCA, with all of its warts and flaws,
with an idealized vision of human decision making unaided by BCA.
In a different context, law professor Howard Latin christened this the
"selective realism" fallacy, because a realistic account of one flawed al-
ternative is unfairly compared to an idealized version of the other al-
27ternative.
Graham at least briefly contrasts BCA with the alternative decision
making approaches suggested by its critics and finds them wanting.28
But he does not describe as clearly as he might that one of the great
virtues of BCA is that its flaws are known and their direction predict-
25 See generally NATURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER: 2001
UPDATE (2001); Nat'l Acad. Of Scis., Arsenic in Drinking Water (2001),
http://dels.nas.edu/dels/viewiepoit.cgiid-1599 (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). The de-
scription of the report on the website of the National Academy Press highlighted its
significance as follows:
The Environmental Protection Agency's decision in the summer of 2001 to
delay implementing a new, rnore stringent standard for the maximum allow-
able level for arsenic in drinking water generated a great deal of criticism and
controversy.... The report's findings are consistent with those of the 1999
report that found high risks of cancer at the previous federal standard of 50
parts per billion. In ftcl, the new report concludes that men and women who consume
water containing 3 paai. per billion of arsenic daily have about a I in 1,000 increased
isk (f developing bladder oi lung caner during heir l/etime.
Id., http://w w.nap.edu/catalog.phprecoid-id-10194#desciiption (last visited Feb.
23, 2009) (emphasis added).
26 See E. Donald Elliott, Global Climate Change and Rtg'ultaory llncertainty, 9 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 259 (1992) (balancing the costs and benefits of acting on current
science versus waiting for futtre information in regulatory decision making).
27 See Latin, .sulna note 2, at 503.
28 Graham, supra note 3, at 438-48 (comparing BCA to the alternative approaches
of absolutisIi, feasibility, and intuitive balancing).
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able and that they are different from the flaws of unaided human de-
cision making. Thus, a composite system in which both BCA and hu-
man intuition and judgment are combined may result in better deci-
sions than using just either one alone, as each compensates for the
weaknesses in the other.
There is a large and growing literature that catalogues the frailties
of unaided human decision making in managing risks. For example,
as a result of the "availability heuristic," unaided human judgment
may cause us to take regulatory action against a risk that seems obvi-
ous, even though our well-intentioned action is actually perverse be-
cause it increases overall risks from substitutes. One reason that we
are increasingly aware of the perils of making regulatory decisions that
unintentionally substitute greater risks is because risk assessment" and
BCA have given us relatively objective and consistent, albeit arbitrary,
tools for measuring and comparing risks.
Equally pertinent to the role of BCA in the GIRA review process
are two practical political points: (1) that BCA can be a useful tool for
convincing "doubting Thomases" that a regulatory measure is worth-
while, and (2) that BCA may be useful in exposing really bad propos-
als that produce few measurable benefits but are either symbolically or
materially satisfying to a powerful constituency or interest group that
has "captured" an agency (i.e., to expose and thereby help to prevent
"rent seeking," whether financial or ideological).
A. Persuading "Doubting Thomases"
In what I find to be one of the most interesting and important
parts of his article, Graham reports that BCA actually helped him get
29 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCI-
PLE (2005) (discussing the responsibility of regulators to ignore irrational public fear
of trivial risk when regulating); Paul Slovic et al., A//eef, Risk, and Decision Making; 24
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 35 (2005) (studying the ways in which emotions and feelings affect
perceptions of risk).
See SUNSTEIN, suf)ra note 29, at 36-39; see also RISK NS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PRO-
TECTING HEALTH AND THE EN\IRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener
eds., 1995).
31 ,Risk assessment" is a set of techniques for estimating and comparing risks
based upon available scientific evidence. See geneally Gail Chamiley, Iealth Risk Assess-
men l, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE DESKBOOK (Janie W. Conrad ed., 1998). In
regulator y decision making about the environment, the "benefit" side of the benefit-
cost ratio is generally the risk reduction anticipated fion a proposed regulation as pre-
dicted by the agency's risk assessment. See Sally Katzen, Cosi-lene/il Analysis: Where
Should We Go from Here?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1313, 1315-17 (2006) (discussing the
use of data for the calculation of costs and benefits by agencies).
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several tough environmental regulations approved by a skeptical
White House) This rings true to me based on my own experiences
working in government under a Republican administration. We also
found that we were not very successful when we said to then-White
House Chief of Staff John Sununu, a well-known environmental skep-
tic, the equivalent of "please sign off on this multimillion dollar regu-
lation. It will make the birds and bunnies and their supporters
happy." But we could win Sununu's support, and those of others in
the White House who were not true believers in environmental pro-
tection, when we could prove to them via BCA that the measurable
benefits of a proposal far exceeded the costs.
Like other quantitative techniques, BCA is a useful language of
discourse when one is attempting to persuade people who do not in-
tuitively share one's own values, preconceptions and intuitions about
the world. When most critics imagine policy making without BCA,
they implicitly assume a benign and well-meaning decision maker who
totally shares their values. This can be called the "If I were King" fal-
lacy. It is a dangerous oversimplification of the real world, in which
people often disagree in their unaided intuitions about what is good
policy, and thus techniques of deliberative democracy and rational
dialogue are needed to persuade people whose "holistic, intuitive"
predilections are not always favorable to environmental regulation.
If instead one hopes to persuade the "doubting Thomases" in a
pluralistic society in which not everyone shares the intuition that every
regulation proposed in the name of the environment is self-evidently a
good thing, then one needs a tool such as BCA that relies less on in-
tuition and more on measurable benefits. And note here that the al-
leged anti-regulatory bias in BCA as currently practiced by OIRA actu-
ally works in favor of the environmental advocate: "This is so good,
boss, that even the OIRA BCA showed huge measurable economic
benefits to society, and we all know how tough that is!"
The critics underestimate the substantial value that BCA brings to
practical policy making as a language of discourse for persuading
skeptics who are not already convinced.
.2 See Graham, supra note 3, at 465-80 (documenting the use of BCA by OIRA to
conxince the White House to support regulations reducing both diesel-engine exhaust
and sulfur and nitrogen oxides fioin coal-fueled power plants and increasing the fuel
efficiency of cars and light trucks). AccordJohn D. Graharn, The Evolving Rtgulatoly Role
qf the U.S. Office ofMJanmagement and Budget, 1 REV. ENIL. ECON. & POL'Y 171 (2007).
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B. Exposing Really Bad Agency Proposals
Finally, another valuable use for BCA is actually the inverse of the
one just discussed-sometimes BCA can expose really bad proposals
by a single-mission agency that are based solely on ideology or inter-
est-group pressure but little else.
The intellectual roots of the GIRA review process can be traced
back to a 1975 article coauthored by Lloyd Cutler, later White House
counsel in the Clinton administration. Cutler and Johnson argued
that "single mission" agencies would tend to pursue their own goals
without properly balancing them sufficiently against other competing
values', and proposed an enhanced White House review process to
weigh desirable social goals against one another.5
The emphasis on Kaldor-Hicks "welfarism" at a philosophical level
in the Graham article obscures the fact that the "cost" side of the
beneiftcost balance is also a measure of "opportunity cost"-the other
uses to which the government or the private sector might put scarce
resources. Sometimes agencies do lose sight of larger social-policy ob-
jectives in the single-minded pursuit of their own missions. When this
happens, the GIRA review process using BCA can be helpful to detect
a gross disparity between the social resources that an agency proposes
to devote to a proposed rule and the value that those resources might
produce if put to other competing uses, either in government or in
the private sector. For example, one rule that came before us when I
was at the EPA initially had a computed cost of $60 billion per statisti-
cal life saved over 30 years. In the rare instances when disparities be-
tween costs and benefits are really gross, BCA can be a useful tool to
put agency proposals into the context of broader social goals.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, BCA can be a very useful, albeit imperfect, tech-
nique for comparing policies. BCA must be used with caution and
evaluated carefully, because it is subject to misunderstanding and
misuse. These problems are particularly intense when BCA is used to
try to set optimal levels of regulatory restrictions, as is sometimes the
case in the current OIRA review process, because small differences be-
tween policies can be overwhelmed by the effect of the arbitrary as-
. See Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, legulation and the Political Pocess, 84
YALE L.J. 1395 (1975).
' Id. at 1402-09.
M Id. at 1414-17.
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sumptions used. BCA is more helpful when used as a uniform yard-
stick for setting priorities among different possible lifesaving invest-
ments that exhibit large discrepancies in their benefit-cost ratios, be-
cause those comparisons are less sensitive to the assumptions used,
provided that they are used consistently.
BCA is inherently imperfect, but there are no perfect techniques
for making complex policy decisions. Therefore, the user must assess
critically whether the technique is appropriate for the task at hand,
take the results with a large grain of salt, and mix them with a large
helping of old-fashioned human judgment. BCA and intuitive human
judgment are stronger together than either alone.
To paraphrase Churchill, BCA is the worst tool currently available
for assisting political appointees in making difficult regulatory deci-
sions affecting the environment-except for all of the others!""
Preferred Citation: E. Donald Elliott, Response, Only a Poor Workman
Blames His Tools: On Uses and Abuses of Benefit-Cost Analysis in Regulatory
Decision Making about the Environment, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
178 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/03-2009/
Elliott.pdf.
As Churchill famously declared in reference to the democratic form of govern-
ment:
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of
sin and woe.... No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. In-
deed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except
all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.
Winston Churchill, Speech in the House on the Parliament Bill (Nov. 11, 1947), in A
CHURCHILL READER: THE WIT AND WISDOM OF SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL 120, 120-121
(Colin R. Coote ed., 1954), available at
http: // wNwN.ai-chive.o-g/ details /CunchillreadertOOO277ibp.pdf.
